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Abstract
It has recently been argued that the informal sector in developing countries
shows a dual structure, with part of the informal sector being competitive to the
formal sector and part of the informal sector being the result of market segmen-
tation. We formulate an econometric model to test this hypothesis. The model
allows for sector multiplicity with unobserved sector a±liation in the informal
sector and takes into account sample selection bias induced by the employment
decision of individuals. An estimation of the model for the urban labor market
in C^ ote d'Ivoire shows that the informal labor market is indeed composed of two
segments with both competitive as well as segmented employment.
JEL Codes: J42, O17
Keywords: informal labor market, segmentation, comparative advantage, se-
lection bias, latent structure, ¯nite mixture.
11 Introduction
One often observed characteristic of urban labor markets in developing countries is
the coexistence of a small well-organized \formal-sector" with relatively high wages
and attractive employment conditions with a large \informal-sector", with low as well
as volatile earnings. The important question for both the understanding of the labor
market and policy recommendations is whether this phenomenon is due to labor market
segmentation or if competitive labor market theories still hold despite the observed
di®erences in wages and working conditions in the formal and informal sector.
Traditional dualistic labor market theories assert that the informal sector is the
disadvantaged sector into which workers enter to escape unemployment once they are
rationed out of the formal sector where wages are set above market-clearing prices for
either institutional (Fields, 1990) or e±ciency-wage reasons (Stiglitz, 1976). Hence it
is argued that workers in the informal sector earn less than observationally identical
workers in the formal sector and if no entry barriers existed, workers from the informal
sector would enter the formal one.
Whereas the empirically shown di®erences between earnings in the formal and in-
formal sectors have not been questioned, it has been claimed that mere existence of
lower wages and lower returns to education and experience in the informal sector does
not imply market segmentation.1 In particular, a labor market with two distinct wage
equations does not constitute a segmented labor market as long as freedom of choice
between the two sectors is given (e.g. Dickens and Lang, 1985). An alternative expla-
nation for the existence of two segments in the labor market would then rather assert
that a large number of those working in the informal sector choose to do so voluntarily,
either because the informal sector has desirable non-wage features (Maloney, 2004) and
individuals maximize their utility rather than there earnings, or because workers have
a comparative advantage in the informal sector and would not do any better in the
formal sector (e.g. Gindling, 1991).
Hence two opposing theories exist. The segmentation hypothesis sees informal
employment as a strategy of last resort to escape involuntary unemployment, whereas
the comparative advantage hypothesis sees the informal employment as a voluntary
choice of workers' based on income or utility maximization.
Most recent theory has combined these polar views and emphasized a more complex
1See Rosenzweig (1988) for literature review.
2structure of the informal sector. Fields (2005) suggests that the informal sector is
most likely to consist of two latent groups: the \upper-tier" and \lower-tier" informal
market. The \upper-tier" represents the competitive part into which individuals enter
voluntarily because, given their speci¯c characteristics, they expect to earn more than
they would do in the formal sector. The \lower-tier", to the contrary, is the part that
consists of the workers rationed out of the formal sector. Considerations of the same
type can be found in Maloney (2004), who calls the two groups \voluntary entry" and
\involuntary entry" informal sectors.
Despite the variety of the above described views on the structure of the labor
market in a developing economy, neither of them has so far received a satisfactory
empirical treatment. Among the most notable empirical contributions one can list
Magnac (1990), who addresses the hypothesis of competitiveness in the framework of
an extended Roy model. Despite ¯nding evidence of a competitive rather than a dual
labor market structure, the model of Magnac (1990) considers only a homogeneous
informal sector and therefore cannot provide us with information about the validity
of the most recent theoretical view of Maloney (2004) and Fields (2005). The paper
of Gindling (1991) addresses the same question of competitiveness in a framework of
generalized regression with sample selection introduced by Lee (1983). Though, like in
Magnac (1990), homogeneity of the informal sector is again a drawback. Cunningham
and Maloney (2001) o®er possibly a ¯rst attempt to model the latent structure of the
informal market explicitly, representing the informal sector as a mixture of \upper-tier"
and \lower-tier" enterprises. However, Cunningham and Maloney (2001) consider only
informal entrepreneurs so an option of choosing formal sector employment does not even
exist in their model. Finally, unlike Magnac (1990) and Ginndling (1991), Cunningham
and Maloney (2001) do not consider selection bias induced by the employment decision.
In this paper we suggest a relatively simple econometric framework, that is able to
model for the sample selection bias, as Magnac (1990) and Gindling (1991), and at the
same time consider the latent structure of the informal labor market, as in Cunningham
and Maloney (2001). Following Maloney (2004) and Fields (2005) we let the informal
sector consist of a ¯nite number of groups with unobservable a±liation and distinct
earnings equations in each group. As a result, the whole labor market is represented
as a mixture model with both observable (for the formal sector) and unobservable (for
the informal sector) group membership. As long as irrespective of group a±liation the
individual employment decision is always in°uenced by the outside option of being non-
3employed, as in Heckman (1979), we make the component densities being dependent
on this decision. This leads us to a ¯nite mixture with sample selection, which is a
generalization of the original model of Heckman (1979).
The ¯nite mixture setting of the suggested model also o®ers an intuitively appealing
test for the existence of entry barriers between di®erent sectors (see Section 3 for other
literature on testing duality). The rationale of this test is that under the assumption
that agents are earnings maximizers and can freely enter di®erent sectors, the distri-
bution of agents across sectors induced by the earnings maximizing decision would be
the same as the estimated mixing distribution. Rejection of the equality of these two
distributions will imply existence of entry barriers, i.e. market segmentation.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we outline the econometric model
and discuss its features. Section 3 presents the data, the estimation results and relates
our model to the existing empirical literature. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 Econometric Model
2.1 Speci¯cation
Finite Mixture Assume that the labor market Y consists of J disjoint sets Yj such
that Y =
SJ
j=1 Yj. Let earnings in each Yj be outcomes of a random variable Yj with
probability distribution F(yijµj) such that for all j F(yijµj) are distinct and independent
of each other. Next assume that for a given earnings outcome yi a±liation with any of
Yj is unobservable, but it is known that P(yi 2 Yj) = ¼j. Then the population density





In other words, we suggest that the labor market consists of an arbitrary number of
segments with distinct earnings distribution in each of them and our basic speci¯cation
is a conventional mixture model.
Assume that in any segment Yj the wage equation is given by
yi = xi¯j + ui; ui » N(0;¾
2
jjxi;yi 2 Yj); (2)
where xi represents a set of personal characteristics that determine individual earnings
yi. Johnson et al. (1992) show that r-th raw moment of any ¯nite mixture can be
4computed by ¹r (yi) =
PJ












Sample Selection The reason why the regression in (3) may not be the ultimate
speci¯cation is given in Heckman (1979). Namely, wages are observed only if they
exceed the individual reservation wage. Consequently, being in°uenced by the sub-
jective employment decision, the observed earnings sample need not necessarily be
representative of the whole population.
Let the reservation wage of every individual depend on a set of personal character-
istics zi. Writing down the selection equation
yis = zi° + uis; uis » N(0;1); (4)
in which zi° re°ects the individual decision to work, we state that wages yi in equation
(2) are only observed if the realization of the selection variable yis is, without loss of
generality, positive.
Assume that the errors of the Yj-speci¯c equation (2) and the selection equation























Repeating the argument of Heckman (1979), the sample counterpart of the population
regression in (3) becomes














E(uijuis > ¡zi°;xi;µj)¼j; (6)
where E(uijjuis > ¡zi°) 6= 0 unless ½j = 0. Both (5) and (6) imply that as a conse-
quence of selection the error term vi in the regression on the observed sample
yi = E(yi) + vi

























where ' and © are the standard normal density and distribution functions.2
The above mixture model is a generalization of Heckman regression with sample
selection that allows for J di®erent generation processes of the dependent variable
instead of only one, as in the classical model. From the very outset we assume that the
work decision rule is the same across all sectors (i.e. °j = °, 8j). This assumption is,
however, by no means restrictive. It just implies that if all individuals were identical,
they would have had the same reservation wage.
Our next result demonstrates under which conditions the model in (7) rules out the
existence of two distinct mixtures with same probability law for the observed dependent
variable. The proof relies on Teicher (1963) su±cient condition for identi¯ability.
Proposition 1 For any given selection rule fZ;°g the ¯nite mixture (7) is identi¯able
if ½j = ½, 8j = 1;:::;J.
Proof. (See Appendix)
From the above proposition we see that the general class of ¯nite mixtures with
sample selection is not identi¯able. So the attention should be restricted to a sub-class
in which correlation between selection and wage equations is the same in every segment.
Additionally, as shown in the Appendix, the assumption of the common selection rule
°j = °, 8j follows from the proof. Finally, identi¯ability result of Proposition 1 is
conditional on the agents' employment decision. However, ° is always identi¯ed from
the data set that contains both employed and non-employed agents.
























where µj = f¯j;¾jg. This speci¯cation is rich enough to provide us with exact results
about market structure in presence of unobserved sector a±liation. Thereby it enables
2Derivation of the component density in (7) replicates the derivation of the likelihood function for
the standard Heckman selection model. For completeness, we also present it in the Appendix.
6us to answer if the model with heterogenous informal market, as suggested by Fields
(2005), can explain more than the traditional dual models.
Sector Choice Assume that agents are earnings maximizers and log-earnings are
completely speci¯ed by xi¯j (i.e. there exists no unobserved component which we can-
not account for). Competitive theory would imply that the individual-speci¯c proba-
bility of choosing sector j is equal to




















P ((¯j ¡ ¯l)xi + ("il ¡ "ij) > 0): (9)
In the context of only two sectors Dickens and Lang (1985) notice that if there are no
entry barriers to the formal sector, the vector of the di®erence in returns to individual
characteristics in the two wage equations must be equal to the corresponding coe±cients
in the equation that determines the individual probability of sector membership.
In our model, despite it is easy to let sector a±liation probabilities ¼j in (8) be
dependent on individual characteristics, with J > 2 the parametrization of ¼j will
be non-linear and the equality result of Dickens and Lang (1985) will not carry over.
Therefore, instead of considering the individual-speci¯c sector choice probabilities, we
concentrate on the distribution of agents over all possible sectors.
Assume that knowing the returns in all sectors, an individual will choose the sector
where the expected earnings given his personal characteristics are maximized. Then
the probability distribution of agents over sectors can be written down as























Equation (10) assumes free sector mobility and therefore provides us with the ex-
pected distribution of individuals on a competitive market.3 On the other hand, the
distribution of agents across sectors is also given by f¼jg
J
j=1 in (8). This fact creates
a basis for the test of free entry into the desired sector. If f¼jg
J
j=1 and the estimated
3Also note that this fact does not exclude that returns to certain individual characteristics in the
chosen sector are lower then in the alternative ones. Consequently, plain comparison of estimated
coe±cients in sector-speci¯c earnings equations cannot be informative about the market structure.
7probabilities in (10) are not signi¯cantly di®erent from each other, one obtains the
equivalence between privately optimal and actual distributions of individuals over sec-
tors, hence, the indication of no entry barriers between the segments of the market.
Rejection of the equality of these two distributions will point at existence of certain
barriers of an unknown form.
The analysis of sector choice and further issues connected with the above implied
test are discussed in detail in Section 3.3.
2.2 Implementation
For the above formulated model the following two-step estimation procedure may be
suggested:
1. On the ¯rst step estimate ° in (4) running Probit.
2. On the second step use zi^ ° as consistent estimates of zi° to estimate the mixture
model in (8).
This approach to estimation of the model ¯ts into to the two-step framework of Mur-
phy and Topel (1985) who demonstrate that under standard regularity conditions for
the likelihood functions on both steps such two-step procedure provides consistent
estimates of the full set of the parameters of interest.
On the second step of the suggested procedure parameters of the mixture model are
estimated by maximum likelihood. For a general case of unobserved sector a±liation











where hi (µj;½) is given in (8).
Typically, and this is also true for the present application, it is possible to observe
from the data whether an agent belongs to the formal sector. So only the a±liation
with any possible segment of the informal market remains unobservable. Denote the
















8where NF is the size of the formal sector. It is also straightforward to show that MLE
of the fraction of formal workers in the economy is equal to their observed sample
proportion.














where D(») is the expected negative Hessian and M(»;°) is the matrix constructed
using scores from the ¯rst and second steps.4
Finally we notice that the suggested two-step procedure is used merely for the
reduction of computational complexity. Alternatively, one can take a full information







ln(1 ¡ ©(zi°)); (14)
where `i stands for the individual contribution to the likelihood function in (11) [(12),
if applies] and Yc denotes the complementary set of non-employed individuals. In this
case the parameter space of the former model augments by ° which has to be estimated
together with ».
3 Empirical Application
3.1 Data and Estimation Method
The data we use is drawn from the Ivorian household survey, the Enquete de Niveau de
Vie, of 1998 which was undertaken by the Institut National de la Statistique de la Cote
d'Ivoire (INSD) and the World Bank. We focus our analysis on the urban population
and limit our sample to individuals between 15 and 65 years old. This leaves us with
a sample size of 5592 individuals. Among these, we consider as inactive individuals
who voluntarily stay out of the labor market as well as those who are involuntarily
unemployed (which is however a negligible proportion of the inactive population).
The active population is classi¯ed into the informal and formal sector. The formal
sector includes individuals working in the public sector as well as wage workers and self-
employed in the formal private sector. As formal private we consider being employed in
4For exact form of M(»;°) see Murphy and Topel (1985).
9Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Labor Market
Total Inactive Active
Informal Formal
Sample 100% 52.6% 31.3% 16.1%
Monthly Wage 98,815.0 { 64,837.8 164,995.1
Males 49.7% 40.6% 49.0% 80.6%
Age 30.0 25.2 34.7 36.6
Education (years) 5.3 5.8 2.9 8.1
Literacy rate 64.1% 69.8% 44.4% 84.0%
Training after schooling 17.6% 11.1% 14.7% 44.3%
Religion:
{ muslim 43.4% 38.3% 56.8% 33.8%
{ christian 42.2% 46.2% 30.6% 52.2%
{ other 14.4% 15.5% 12.6% 14.0%
Living in Abijan 49.6% 50.4% 42.2% 61.7%
Note: Monthly Wage in CFA Francs.
an enterprise which either pursues formal bookkeeping or o®ers written contracts or pay
slips. The informal sector comprises the active population which is neither employed in
the public nor in the private formal sector. The survey contains data on monthly wages
as well as detailed information on socio-economic and demographic characteristics of
individuals. In Table 1 we present summary statistics of the variables used for the
earning equations for the population as a whole, as well as for its inactive and the
\informal" and \formal" parts. As expected, there is a large earnings di®erential
between informal and formal workers. However, Figure 1 also demonstrates that despite
the big di®erence in mean earnings the densities of informal and formal monthly labor
earnings overlap to a large extent, indicating that not all informal work is inferior to
formal employment.
Also, as expected, education level and literacy rates are the highest in the formal
sector. In addition membership in the formal sector is a privilege of males, who con-
stitute 80% of formal employees, which is most likely explained by the gender-speci¯c
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education gap.5 Finally an interesting observation can be made about the distribution
of religion groups in the active population: despite the fraction of Muslims and Chris-
tians in the entire sample is almost the same, formal sector is dominated by Christians
whereas informal sector is dominated by Muslims.
To specify the selection equation of the model (see p.6) we use further variables,
such as the number of infants in the household, the number of children under 14 in
the household, the number of old household members, household size and the number
of active members in the household. When estimating the model we opt for the two-
step approach described on p.9. This ensures a well-behaved numerical problem that
converges from a wide range of starting values. The model is estimated using BFGS
algorithm with analytical derivatives.
3.2 Composition of the Labor Market
We ¯rst analyze the sector composition of the labor market. The developed model in (8)
¯rst of all allows for an arbitrary number of segments where individual a±liation to any
5For the whole sample, the average length of education among males is more than 60% higher than
among females.
11Table 2: Model Selection





Test Statistic Cr.Value Test Statistic Cr.Value
Andrews'
Â2-Test 155.26 51.00 143.35 51.00
of them may not necessarily be observable. Second, and not less important, the model
takes into account selectivity induced by employment decision, which ensures consistent
estimation of conditional means of the segment-speci¯c earnings distributions.
We estimate two speci¯cations: the model with homogeneous informal sector and
the model with an informal sector that consists of two latent groups. Estimation
results for both models are provided in Tables A1-A2 of the Appendix. To decide on
the ultimate number of segments on the market we use information criteria (Akaike,
consistent Akaike and Schwarz) and Andrews (1988) goodness of ¯t test based on the
di®erence between observed and predicted cell frequencies.6
The results on model selection are presented in Table 2. First of all, the values
of the Andrews Â2 test statistics indicate clear rejection of the homogeneity of the
informal sector. In addition to that, all information criteria uniformly show that the
speci¯cation with dichotomous informal sector is superior to the homogeneous model.
Thus the labor market under study consists of at least three distinct parts: the formal
6Andrews (1988) shows that if P(¡) is the empirical measure and F(¡;µ) is the conditional em-
pirical measure de¯ned on a partition Y £ X = [i°i and v(¡;µ) ´
p
n(P(¡) ¡ F(¡;µ)), then:
v(¡;µ)0§+v(¡;µ) » Â2
rkj§j, where § is the covariance matrix of v(¡;µ). Three di®erent estimators
of § are o®ered. Here we use a ^ §2n-estimator for the case when ^ µ is asymptotically not fully e±cient,
which is true for our two-step procedure (see Andrews 1988, p.1431-1432). Finally, for Y £ X we
partition X with respect to sex and formal sector membership and for each group form cells for Y:
12sector and two latent segments of the informal sector.
Even though cell frequencies generated by the better-¯tting model are still signif-
icantly di®erent from the observed ones, consideration of the speci¯cation with the
three-part informal sector does not bring any improvement in terms of information
criteria. As the attempt to further re¯ne heterogeneity of the informal sector leads to
the unnecessary overparametrization of the model, we conclude that the speci¯cation
with the dichotomous informal market is the best ¯tting and at the same time the most
parsimonious one.
Let us analyze the properties of each segment of the labor market in more detail.
From the results reported in Table A.2 one can infer that the two latent informal
segments make 57.5% and 48.5% of the informal sector respectively, which shows that
each of them constitutes a signi¯cant part of the informal sector. Expected wages in
both informal segments are clearly below the expected wage in the formal sector. But
in addition to that there is a signi¯cant earnings di®erential between the mean earnings
in the two informal sectors.
Wage equations across the three segments are also quite diverse. As expected,
returns to education and experience are high in the formal sector. In the better-paid
informal sector experience as well as education have also a high and signi¯cant impact
on wages. But whereas returns to experience are the same as in the formal sector,
returns to education are almost twice as low as in the formal sector. In contrast, in
the lower-paid informal sector returns to experience are only two thirds of the returns
to experience in the formal and higher-paid informal sector and there are no returns
to education at all. Workers in this sector are hence stuck with very low wages almost
independent of their abilities.7 Eventually, it is important to notice the signi¯cance
of correlation coe±cient ½, which underlines the necessity of accounting for sample
selection bias when estimating slope coe±cients in segment-speci¯c wage equations.
Thus, we do not only ¯nd that the labor market under study consists of three
di®erent segments, but that these segments also have quite distinct patterns of returns
to individual characteristics. On the ¯rst glance, among the di®erent theories on labor
7Furthermore, gender has a signi¯cant impact on earnings in all parts of the market, but the male-
female wage gap is wider in the two informal sectors than in the formal sector. In addition, living in
the capital city Abijan has a positive impact on wages in both informal segments and no in°uence
on formal earnings; being a Muslim has only a signi¯cant positive impact on wages in the low-paid
informal segment.
13market composition (as described in the introduction), the labor market structure
proposed by Fields (2005) and Maloney (2004) seems to be the closest our empirical
estimates. Though, even such obvious diversity in the characteristics of the segments
does not automatically mean that the labor market may not ¯t into either the dualistic
or the competitive labor model. Rephrasing Basu (1997, p.151-152), it is beyond doubts
that the market may be split into several segments. But if all these segments possess
the properties attributable to a competitive market, the whole labor market can be as
well treated as competitive. Alternatively, if the detected fragments can be categorized
as two groups between which entry barriers exist, the market will be dual. Therefore,
to attribute the correct properties to the above described parts of the market, one
has to consider whether the observed distribution of individuals across segments is the
result of sector choice (competitive market) or entry-barriers into sectors (segmented
market).
3.3 Entry Barriers or Comparative Advantage?
We seek to answer whether employment in the two informal segments is the result of
own comparative advantage considerations or a result of entry-barriers into the formal
market. The basic argument for the analysis to follow is presented in Section 2.1, p.7.
Assuming that agents are earnings maximizers and there is no unobserved components
for which we cannot account in our model, the agents will choose the sector in which
the expected earnings given their personal characteristics are maximized. This sector
choice mechanism induces a probability distribution of agents across sectors formulated









= xi^ ¯j + ^ ½^ ¾j
'(¡zi^ °)
1 ¡ ©(¡zi^ °)
:
If no barriers of entry to either sector exist, the distribution in (10) must be the same
as the mixing distribution f¼jg
J
j=1. To the contrary, if there are certain institutional
rigidities or statistical discrimination on the employers' side the individuals will be
heaped in undesired sectors. As a result there will be a mismatch between the estimated
^ ¼j-s and the distribution of individuals that would obtain if individuals were found in
the sector where (given their characteristics) they would maximize their earnings.
In Figure 2 we present the estimated by f^ ¼jg
J
j=1 and implied by (10) probabilities
for being a±liated with every sector. Form this ¯gure one can already see that the
14Figure 2: Distribution of Agents across Sectors




















fraction of those who, conditional on their personal characteristics, expect to be better
o® in formal sector almost doubles the actual share of the formal sector in the market.
On the other hand, the opposite situation can be seen for the \lower-paid"-informal
segment (Informal II).
Since the variances of the estimated point mass values ¼j are known, the easiest
way of setting up the test would be to take the expected frequencies implied by (10)
as given and formulate a Wald test of their joint equality to ¼j. Even though such
test will overreject, the respective test statistic of 895.17 clearly indicates that even
with the knowledge of the variances of the implied point mass values we would get a
rejection. Estimation of the covariance matrix is complicated by maxfg-operator in
(10), which makes Taylor approximation inapplicable. This is also the reason why we
cannot perform the LR test: by virtue of maxfg-operator the likelihood function under
null is not everywhere di®erentiable and hence the distribution of the likelihood ratio
is unknown.
To suggest an additional alternative, we bootstrap the test. In Table 3 we report the
bootstrap con¯dence intervals for the estimated and implied probability mass values
(^ ¼ and ~ ¼, respectively) and for their ratio. The hypothesis of the equality of the two
distributions is rejected when the ratio of these values signi¯cantly departs from unity.
15Table 3: Distribution of Agents across Sectors
Formal Informal-1 Informal-2
Value [95% Conf.Interval] Value [95% Conf.Interval] Value [95% Conf.Interval]
^ ¼j 0:3392 [0:3224; 0:3554] 0:3767 [0:2325; 0:4867] 0:2840 [0:1717; 0:4279]
~ ¼j 0:6136 [0:3727; 0:7740] 0:2929 [0:1425; 0:5237] 0:0935 [0:0337; 0:1813]
^ ¼j=~ ¼j 0:5528 [0:4348; 0:9284] 1:2863 [0:5251; 3:1431] 3:0385 [1:2043; 8:5987]
We ¯nd that for the formal sector and the \lower"-informal sector signi¯cant departure
from unity is indeed the case. So the hypothesis of unlimited intersectoral mobility and,
consequently, competitiveness, is once again rejected.
To sum up: The amount of workers that would chose to enter the formal sector is
signi¯cantly higher than the amount of workers actually employed in the formal sector.
At the same time the amount of workers in the \lower"-tier of the informal sector is
almost three times as high as the amount of workers that would voluntarily choose
staying in this segment. Finally, the number of individuals a±liated with the \upper"
-tier of the informal sector is the same as the number of those who would chose to be
in this sector. Since the workers are free to move between any segments of the informal
market, the three statements above imply that there exists an entry barrier between
formal and \lower"-tier informal sectors.
This result establishes empirical relevance of the dichotomous structure of the in-
formal market, as suggested by Fields (2005) and Maloney (2004). For the theoretical
modelling of the labor market in a developing economy this means that there may exist
cases in which neither solely competitive theories, nor exclusively dual frameworks will
provide satisfactory approximation of market interactions. For the empirical literature
our results are even more important, as we ¯nd that testing for competitiveness in the
context of the developing economy can be misspeci¯ed by either ignoring the employ-
ment decision (i.e. selection bias) or, which is more alerting, ignoring the heterogeneity
of the informal sector. Empirical contribution of our model, as well as its shortcomings
16are brie°y discussed in the next section.
3.4 Empirical Models for Dual and Competitive Markets
An acknowledged benchmark in the empirical literature on testing duality versus com-
petitiveness is a paper of Dickens and Lang (1985), who were the ¯rst to account
for unobservability of sector a±liation by implementing a switching regime regression.
However, the follow up paper of Heckman and Hotz (1986) has provided a fundamental
critique addressed not only to Dickens and Lang (1985), but also to the general frame-
work of conducting such tests. Namely, Heckman and Hotz (1986) state such potential
sources of misspeci¯cation as:
(i) sector multiplicity in the market,
(ii) the fact that agents are utility maximizers rather than earnings maximizers,
(iii) inability to separate mobility costs across sectors from entry barriers,
(iv) false distributional assumptions.
All the papers that followed, have dealt only with selected number of points. Heckman
and Sedlacek (1985) explicitly introduce non-wage valuation of the sector and thereby
tackle (ii); Magnac (1990) considers cost of entry and resolves (iii).
In this paper we consistently discuss (i), developing a model that allows both for
sample selection and sector multiplicity. Explicit introduction of heterogeneity in a
form of distinct segments with unobserved a±liation provides a relative advantage in
comparison to all models that originate from the Roy framework, as these models
(including both Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985, and Magnac, 1990) are con¯ned to only
two sectors with observed sector membership, out of which homogeneity of the informal
sector follows.8
In addition to that, we ¯nd signi¯cance of the that sample selection bias induced by
employment decision. This means that the studies that consider a latent structure of
the labor market (e.g. Dickens and Lang, 1984, and Cunningham and Maloney, 2001)
but ignore sample selection may potentially su®er from this type of misspeci¯cation.
Concerning (ii), with exception of Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), all existing models
are not robust to distributional assumptions. One possible advantage of our framework
8Although the framework of Magnac (1990) has de¯nitely a great advantage in modelling entry
costs and richer speci¯cation of nonparticipation.
17in this respect is that by increasing the number of unobserved classes one can reduce
the severity of misspeci¯cation, which is a positive feature of all mixture models.
From this perspective the framework developed in the present paper certainly ¯lls
some of the gaps in the empirical literature on informal sector heterogeneity and labor
market segmentation.
To relative disadvantages of our model one can add the \ex-post" nature of the
sector choice, once the employment decision is made. Our model does not make any
statement about the exact mechanism of the self-selection, whereas even in the simplest
Roy model without employment decision this mechanism is modelled explicitly (see
Borjas, 1987). We also need to admit that, unlike in Heckman and Sedlacek (1985),
our model in its present formulation does not consider agents as utility-maximizers to
comply with (iii). Extension to utility-maximizing agents invokes a more complicated
identi¯ability problem and is reserved for future work.
4 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we formulate an econometric model that accounts for sample selection and
sector multiplicity when sector a±liation of any particular observation is not necessarily
observable. We apply this model to learn about the composition of the urban labor
market in C^ ote d'Ivoire.
First, our results support the hypothesis that the informal labor market has a di-
chotomous structure with distinct wage equations and therefore should not be regarded
as one homogenous sector. Moreover, we show that one part of the informal sector is
superior over the other in terms of signi¯cantly higher earnings as well as higher returns
to education and experience.
Next we test whether the detected latent structure of the informal sector is a result
of market segmentation, that deters individuals from entering the formal sector, or
rather a result of comparative advantage considerations, where individuals given their
speci¯c characteristics voluntarily enter the informal sector. The outcome we get points
at the existence of entry barrier to the formal sector for the \lower"-tier informal sector,
whereas comparative advantage considerations seem to be the cause for the existence of
the \upper"-tier informal sector. Hence, the informal sector comprises both, individuals
who are voluntarily informal and individuals for whom the informal sector is a strategy
18of last resort to escape involuntary unemployment.
From a policy point of view, it is important to take into account the latent structure
of the informal labor market, because recommendations for the two distinct informal
sectors are clearly di®erent. Individuals who voluntary participate in the informal
sector just realize an opportunity to earn more than they would in the formal sector.
But as they still have much lower earnings than employees in the formal sector, policies
have to address their individual endowments to improve earning possibilities.
With regard to the \lower"-tier informal sector, policy interventions have to counter
entry barriers to the formal sector. Moreover, agents found in the \involuntary" part of
informal market show especially low earnings which are also much lower than earnings
in the \voluntary" informal part. So if the policy objective is to address the most
disadvantaged, the \lower"-tier informal sector should receive the highest priority.
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20Appendix
Component Density of the Error Term
Consider a component density f(uijuis > ¡zi°;µj). Using Bayes rule (for simplicity of
notation we suppress conditioning on yi 2 Yj) we get
f(uijuis > ¡zi°;µj) =
P(uis > ¡zi°jui;µj)f(uijµj)
P(uis > ¡zi°)




j) and marginal density f(uijµj) » N(0;¾2
j). Thus


































where µj = f¯j;¾j;½jg and ' and © are the probability density and distribution func-
tions of the Standard Normal distribution.


















































































































































































(also notice that for ½j = 0 the transform reduces to that of the Normal distribution).
Let Sj denote the domain of de¯nition of Áj(t). First, for any l;j, Sj µ Sl, which
ful¯lls the ¯rst requirement of Theorem 2 of Teicher (1963).
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where the last equality obtains recognizing that the integral one step before is a Gaus-
sian kernel.



















































Repeating the ordering argument of Teicher (1963) we see that the general class of
mixtures (7) is not identi¯able because there is no lexicographic order hj (y) Á¾;½ hl (y)
that can insure that the leading term in the exponent will always converge to zero as
t¤ ! +1.
However, restricting the attention to a sub-class, in which ½l = ½j 8l;j 2 [1;J] we
obtain the claimed result. For any l;j 2 [1;J] let ½l = ½j and order the subfamily
lexicographically so that hj (y;¹j;¾j;½) Á hj (y;¹l;¾l;½) if ¾l < ¾j and ¹l > ¹j when




which ful¯lls the second and the last requirement of Theorem 2 of Teicher (1963).
Since the su±cient condition of Teicher (1963) applies, the sub-class of ¯nite mix-
tures (7) with common ½ is identi¯able.
Remark From the Proof above immediately follows that allowing for a sector-speci¯c
selection rule (i.e. letting a be aj = z°j) leads to an unidenti¯able model, since the























and even within the considered sub-class of ½l = ½j = ½ there is no ordering over f¹g
which will insure that this limit is zero once ¾l = ¾j.
23Estimation Results
Table A.1: \The Model with the Homogeneous Informal Sector" x
Formal Informal
Coe®. (Std.Error) Coe®. (Std.Error)
Intercept ¤ 7:0595 0:3797 Intercept ¤ 7:5028 0:2378
Sex ¤ 0:3443 0:0732 Sex ¤ 0:5734 0:0538
Age ¤ 0:1300 0:0196 Age ¤ 0:1062 0:0127
Age2/100 ¤ ¡0:1184 0:0258 Age2/100 ¤ ¡0:1215 0:0165
Education ¤ 0:1058 0:0091 Education ¤ 0:0421 0:0105
Literacy ¡0:1420 0:1140 Literacy ¡0:0466 0:0844
Training ¤ 0:1598 0:0626 Training ¤ 0:2006 0:0802
Muslim 0:1542 0:0896 Muslim ¤ 0:2580 0:0781
Christian ¡0:0185 0:0849 Christian 0:1225 0:0831
Abijan 0:0809 0:0576 Abijan ¤ 0:2273 0:0506
¾F
¤ 0:8288 0:0192 ¾I
¤ 1:0261 0:0174
½ ¤ 0:0953 0:0467
¼ ¤
F : 0:3392 0:0092 ¼ ¤
I : 0:6608 0:0092
Expected log-Wage: 11:3524 Expected log-Wage: 10:3183
Expected Wage: 105084:42 Expected Wage: 33816:37
Selection Equation Number of Obs. (missing): 2939
Number of Obs. (mixture): 2653
Intercept ¡0:0422 0:0400
Sex ¤ 0:5682 0:0374 Log-Likelihood: ¡5332:92
Infants ¤ 0:2705 0:0196
Children ¤ 0:2677 0:0162
Old ¡0:0518 0:0439
HH Size ¤ ¡0:2693 0:0092
Active Members ¤ 0:4709 0:0157
x Here and henceforward asterisk indicates signi¯cance at 5% level.
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